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We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they increase the auction price.
Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller, but produce the same expected revenue as
standard auctions.  Our model predicts a particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against
observed auction data.  Our model fits the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items.
The notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding and higher
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Abstract
We analyze a new auction format in which bidders pay a fee each time they in-
crease the auction price. Bidding fees are the primary source of revenue for the seller,
but produce the same expected revenue as standard auctions. Our model predicts a
particular distribution of ending prices, which we test against observed auction data.
Our model ts the data well for over three-fourths of routinely auctioned items. The
notable exceptions are video game paraphernalia, which show more aggressive bidding
and higher expected revenue. By incorporating mild risk-loving preferences in the
model, we explain nearly all of the auctions.
1 Introduction
The relatively minor setup cost of internet websites has facilitated the creation of many
varieties of auction formats. Most of these have close analogs to auctions that have existed
for centuries prior, but occasionally a site develops a novel approach. Such is the case
with Swoopo, a German company founded in 2005 which currently operates websites in the
United Kingdom, Spain, the United States, and Austria. Swoopo's distinctive feature is that
participants must pay a fee each time they place a bid.
Each auction begins at a price of zero and with a specied amount of time on a countdown
clock. When a participant places a bid, the current price increments by a xed amount ($0.15
in the standard auction), the bidder is immediately charged a bid fee ($0.75), and the auction
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1is extended by a set amount of time (15 seconds).1 If the time expires before another bid is
placed, the last bidder pays the current price (on top of any bid fees incurred) and wins the
object.
An observer's rst experience with this auction format typically follows a predictable
course. First, the newcomer notes that the current price on her particular item is remarkably
low | indeed, the median auction closes with a nal price that is 18.9% of the retail price.
The clock is within seconds of expiring, yet our observer quickly realizes that the deal is
elusive, as additional bids are placed every ve to ten seconds. Indeed, her past bids (had
she placed any) are sunk, having no bearing on her likelihood of winning once she is outbid.2
Ideally, she would wait and place the last bid, but she immediately recognizes this to be
the fundamental dilemma of the auction: though it is highly likely that new bids will be
submitted right now, there is a small chance that none will and the auction will end.
On appreciating the low probability of winning, thoughts turn to how much revenue the
auction generates: for every dollar increase in the nal price, Swoopo collects ve dollars in
additional revenue through bid fees. To make a prot, the nal price only needs to exceed
one-sixth of the item's cost. This thought process has led many to question the rationality of
auction participants as well as the ethics of the auctioneers. Blogs and news articles (Kato,
2009; Reklaitis, 2009; Gimein, 2009) have vented their frustrations, referring to Swoopo as
gambling or an outright scam.
Even so, pay-to-bid auctions are growing in popularity. In December 2008, 11 websites
conducted such auctions; by November 2009, the format had proliferated to 35 websites.
Over the same time span, trac among these sites (reported in Table 1) has increased from
1.2 million to 3.0 million unique visitors per month.3 For comparison, trac at ebay.com
uctuated around 75 million unique visitors per month throughout that period. In other
words, pay-to-bid auctions have garnered 4% of the trac held by the undisputed leader in
online auctions.
We provide a simple model of the pay-to-bid auction format that rationalizes the behavior
of bidders. The key insight of this model is that the aggregate probability of being outbid
is pinned down by the requirement that prior bidders had to be willing to bid ex-ante. As
1In an English auction, this last feature is known as a soft close. Extending the clock ensures that
participants always have an opportunity to respond after being outbid, often expressed in oral auctions as
\Going once, going twice, sold!" Amazon.com used to oer English auctions with a soft close, while e-Bay
uses a hard close where the ending time is xed (See Roth and Ockenfels, 2002).
281.3% of the unique usernames participate but never win an auction.
3Web trac was monitored using the web analytics of compete.com. The pay-to-bid industry does not
seem to be consolidating, either. Over this time period, almost all of the 35 sites experienced growth in
trac. Moreover, the concentration of trac has fallen: in December 2008, the top two sites (including
Swoopo) claimed 90% of the market. By November 2009, the top ve sites (including Swoopo) jointly held
75% of the market. Bid fees have fallen, though; many (including Swoopo) are now charging $0.60 per bid.
2a consequence, we can derive a density function describing the probability that the auction
ends at any given number of bids. From this, we show that the pay-to-bid auction raises
an expected revenue that is nearly equal to the bidders' valuation of the item (and thus
equivalent to the revenue that standard auction formats would achieve in this environment).
We test the predictions of our model using information on 34,000 auctions collected from
Swoopo's website.4 We nd that the average revenue of most items falls within one standard
deviation of the expected revenue predicted by our model. Moreover, for most items, the
observed distribution of ending prices ts remarkably well to the distribution predicted by
the model; we fail to reject (at p = 0:05) that the distributions dier for 79% of the routinely
auctioned items.
The one group of items which do not t our basic model are those that involve video game
systems (such as the Wii, Playstation, or Xbox), which produce more aggressive bidding and
higher revenue for Swoopo. However, the model can mimic this behavior by changing bidders'
utility from risk-neutral to risk-preferring. With very reasonable levels of absolute risk
preference (less than half of that estimated for racetrack bettors), the theoretical expected
revenue and ending price distribution line up with the observed data for 97% of the auctioned
items.
We assume that the valuation of the item is known and the same across all potential
bidders. Although rst- or second-price auctions are seldom modeled in a full-information
environment, this assumption is quite common in all-pay or war-of-attrition auctions,5 which
are the closest relatives of the pay-to-bid auction. The common value allows us to isolate a
key aspect of pay-to-bid auctions: a bidder is gambling that others who value the item at
more than the current price may still abstain from bidding. We believe that this would still
be the driving force (though less visibly) in a private valuation framework.
Furthermore, a common value is quite plausible for the types of items regularly auctioned
on Swoopo. All items are new, unopened, and readily available from traditional or internet
retailers. Unlike rare art or collectibles, the market prices of these items are well established.
Indeed, one could interpret the valuation in our model as the lowest price for which the item
may readily be obtained elsewhere (rather than as the individual's literal reservation price).
With that interpretation, the payo from placing a bid is always relative to the utility of
buying the item outright.
Finally, it should be noted that our common value model matches the data very well.
For instance, one might speculate that the auction of a wristwatch that sells at retail for
4Our empirical approach most closely resembles that of Lambson and Thurston (2006).
5Examples include Baye, et al (1996), Clark and Riis (1998), Barut and Kovenock (1998), and Konrad
and Leininger (2007). Alcalde and Dahm (2009) analyze the rst-price auction in a complete information
environment.
3$300 is largely driven by people who only value the watch at $50 and are hoping to win
early in the auction. However, one must consider the probability of being outbid; since an
identical watch is auctioned many times, we can extract that probability. The data speaks
very clearly on this: whether early or late in the auction, if a person values the watch at less
than $300, his expected payo from bidding will be less than the $0.75 bid fee.
At rst glance, one might consider the pay-to-bid auction as a mere reformulation of the
all-pay auction. There, each participant pays what he bids, even though only the highest
bidder wins the item. A second-price all-pay auction (or war of attrition) does the same
except that the winner pays the second highest bid. These are typically modeled in a static,
sealed-bid environment6, but their strategic properties dier signicantly from the pay-to-bid
auction even when set up in the same dynamic format.
The analogy arises because each time an all-pay participant raises his bid, he commits
to pay that increase regardless of whether he wins, and is hence like a bid fee. However, in a
pay-to-bid auction, the bid fee is distinct from the price increment, and the winning bidder
must pay the nal price on top of his bid fees. Moreover, in an all-pay auction, if any active
bidder increased the bid, every active bidder would have to likewise increase their own bids
to remain active (much like calling a bet in poker). A pay-to-bid participant only incurs a
bid fee each time he increases the price.
Pay-to-bid auctions share more in common with work on bidding costs, dened as trans-
action costs that the bidder incurs but are not received as revenue for the seller. These might
include legal or consultant expenses in preparing a bid or an increasing cost of nancing due
to capital market imperfections.7 In one key aspect, bid costs and bid fees are similar: a
participant only places a bid if his expected payo is sucient to cover the certain cost.
Since valuation is homogenous in our model, this imposes our indierence condition. In
the bidding cost models, the cost discourages those with low valuations from participating.
Indeed, when bidding costs are modeled in an ascending auction (e.g. Daniel and Hirshleifer,
1998), participants conserve on bid costs by making jumps in the bid rather than raising the
current price by the minimum increment. In our setting, the bid increment is xed.8
6See Amann and Leininger (1996), Baye, et al (1996), and Krishna and Morgan (1997). An exception is
in H orner and Sahuguet (2007), where two rounds of bidding are allowed.
7Che and Gale (1998) assume that only the winner of the auction incurred the bid cost, while Gavious,
Moldovanu, and Sela (2002) allow all bidders to incur the bid cost; both are set in a static, sealed-bid
environment.
8Allowing jump bids in ascending auctions introduces a variety of strategic behaviors. One may use a
jump bid to signal his private value (Daniel and Hirshleifer, 1998), to intimidate an opponent and thus induce
an asymmetric equilibrium (Avery, 1998), or, for impatient participants, to nish the auction faster (Isaac,
et al, 2007). We are condent that similar issues would arise in pay-to-bid auctions if jump bidding were
allowed, though it would diminish the importance of bid fees as a source of revenue and seriously complicate
the analysis.
4The paper proceeds as follows: in section 2, we present the model and identify its unique
symmetric equilibrium. We also discuss several variations on the model. In section 3, we
discuss the data we have extracted from Swoopo's website. Section 4 presents evidence on
the model's t to the data and section 5 oers conclusions and some broader applications of
the pay-to-bid auction.
2 Model
An item being sold has a known, objective value of v to all potential bidders. This is initially
oered at a price of 0. A customer immediately pays b dollars each time she places a bid,
which also increments the price by s dollars and starts a new period. The auction concludes
if no one places a bid during the current period, resulting in the last bidder paying the
current price and receiving the item. Assume that potential bidders' decisions of when (if
at all) to act are distributed without atoms throughout each period; thus ties never occur.
This constitutes a full information, extensive form game; we examine the symmetric subgame
perfect equilibria.
When a customer places a bid, she is betting b dollars that no one else will bid after her.
Consider a customer who observes the current price at s(q 1) dollars. If she were to place
the qth bid, her expected payo would be (v   s  q)(1   q+1)   b, where q+1 denotes the
probability that anyone else will place the q + 1th bid. She weighs the expected payo of
winning against the certain cost of the bid fee.9
Let Q  v b
s , and for simplicity, assume that Q is an integer. If q > Q, then this customer
will strictly prefer not to bid | regardless of q+1 | because the current price plus bid fee
exceeds the item's value. Thus, q = 0 for all q > Q. If q = Q, this customer is indierent
about bidding (even though Q+1 = 0 and hence winning is assured). Indeed, during this
and all earlier periods of the game, the participants must be indierent about bidding. If
the qth bidder strictly preferred bidding, then q = 1 and therefore the q  1th bidder would
strictly prefer not to bid. If the qth bidder strictly preferred not bidding, then q = 0 and
therefore the q   1th bidder would strictly prefer to bid.
This indierence condition then determines unique probabilities that dene equilibrium
behavior. In particular, for all 1 < q  Q, q = 1   b
v s(q 1). Only the likelihood that
anyone places the rst bid, 1, is non-unique, since there is no prior bidder who must be
made indierent. While any 1 2 [0;1] is consistent with equilibrium, we set 1 = 1   b
v
9One might wonder if the expected payo should also include an option value of placing a bid; that is,
a bidder might place the qth bid even if he will be outbid for certain, because it keeps the auction running
and gives him a chance to place the q +2th bid. However, in equilibrium, the expected payo of placing the
q + 2th bid (net of the bid fee) is zero, so a bidder at period q can ignore the option value.
5for simplicity, assuming in eect that the rst period behavior mimics that of subsequent
periods. This assumption has minimal impact on our analysis, only slightly altering expected
revenue.
We also recognize that other asymmetric equilibria can exist. For instance, suppose the
100th bidder threatens that she will place the 102nd bid with probability 1 if anyone outbids
her. This would dissuade all other participants from placing what would be a wasted 101st
bid. While such equilibria can exist, our analysis ignores them for two reasons. First, the
equilibrium would be dicult to implement if bidders are anonymous, since all potential
bidders would need to know the bidder's specic threat.10 Second, if it were possible to
credibly communicate such threats, the obvious solution is to employ them after the rst bid.
Our empirical observation does not reect this sort of behavior, but matches the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium very well.
2.1 Individual strategies
The probabilities  represent the aggregate consequence of individual mixed strategies. By
specifying the process by which bidders participate in the auction, we can analyze these
individual decisions and interpret the aggregate probabilities better. However, the aggregate
is sucient to analyze the outcome of the auction.
First, consider an environment in which a xed pool of n participants are watching the
auction. In the qth period, every individual chooses a mixed strategy q on the probability of
placing a bid, taking the others' choices as given. In a symmetric equilibrium, this will bear
direct relation to the aggregate probabilities. Suppose that q 1 bids have been placed. The
n   1 customers who currently are not winning must decide whether to place a bid. With
probability (1   q)n 1, none of them do. In order to satisfy the indierence condition for
the q   1th bid, this must equal 1   q. So q = 1   (1   q)
1
n 1.
Suppose instead that bidders arrive to the auction according to a Poisson process, with
rate  per minute. Upon arrival, the bidder instantaneously decides whether to bid (em-
ploying mixed strategy q). If he declines to bid or someone bids after him, he departs the
auction. Again, consider after the q   1th bid has just been placed. If a period lasts T
minutes, the probability that n customers arrive is
e T(T)n
n! , and the probability that all of
them decline to bid would be:
10Andrzej Skrzypacz suggested creating a username \will outbid you over ve bucks" to announce your
strategy. Perhaps to prevent such communication, Swoopo limits the length and content of usernames.






 (1   q)
n = e
 Tq
In order to satisfy the indierence condition for the q   1th bid, this must equal 1   q;
however, it may not be able to do so. In particular, if  and q are suciently small, we could
have e Tq > 1   q for any q. Even so, equilibrium still exists, with minor adaptation.






, with aggregate probability
that someone bids set to 1   e T when the latter case holds. In such an equilibrium, all
bidders who arrive when q is low will strictly prefer to bid even knowing that those who
follow will do the same, because there is a large enough chance that no one will show up at
all. For high enough q, eventually the indierence condition will hold and q again describes
the aggregate probability.
2.2 Expected revenue
In examining the expected revenue of a pay-to-bid auction, we rst consider one particular
variant in which customers bid for the right to purchase an item at a predetermined price
p. In practice, Swoopo still increments the price after each bid as if s = 0:15 (which allows
us to determine the number of bids which occurred), but ignores sq in computing the nal
price. The special case when p = 0 is referred to as a 100% o auction, where nothing is
paid beyond the bid fees.
The advantage of examining these xed price auctions is that it produces a simple prob-
ability distribution. Since indierence requires that (v   p)(1   q)   b = 0, we derive
q = 1   b
v p for all q. This conditional probability (that the qth bid occurs, given that the











We then examine the expected revenue:
1 X
q=1



















We note that this auction is not any more lucrative than standard auction formats. A typical
71st or 2nd price sealed-bid auction among (nearly) identical buyers would raise a revenue
close to v. Yet here, in the instance of a 100% o auction, the expected revenue is essentially
the same, at v   b.
In the standard pay-to-bid auction, q varies with q, which signicantly complicates the
probability density function of ending bids, f(q). In particular, we obtain











v   s  (j   1)

; (4)
with f(0) = 1   1. This density function is decreasing in q; that is, the unconditional
probability of ending at a given number of bids decreases as bids increase. The expected
revenue is more dicult to directly derive with this density function, but this is done in the
appendix, again arriving at an expected revenue of v   b and variance of
b(v b)(s+v)
b+2s .
The former can also be shown via an indirect method. Assuming that the seller places
no intrinsic value on the item, the total expected surplus of the auction is equal to v times
the probability that someone wins the auction, or in other words, the probability that at





= v   b. This expected
surplus is split between the seller and buyers, yet by construction, the expected surplus of
the buyers is zero; hence, the seller's expected revenue is v   b.
As we noted before, 1 is not uniquely determined by an indierence condition, though
the preceding analysis selects 1 to be congruent with the other q. The only impact of this
choice is seen in expected revenue: if for instance the rst bid always occurred, expected
revenue would be v. While such equilibria do exist, we nd it less plausible that the rst bid
would be dramatically dierent from those that follow. Moreover, in our empirical ndings
which follow, we do in fact observe a small proportion of auctions concluding without a single
bid, consistent with our selected equilibrium.
2.3 Shill bidding
One concern about this auction format is that it could be manipulated by the auctioneer
to generate more revenues; indeed, a popular accusation against Swoopo is that the website
employs shill bidders (who place bids for free to drive up the nal price). As shown in the
remainder of the paper, our model is able to explain the observed data without incorporating
any malfeasance from the auctioneer, but we can oer two comments on shill bidding.
One must ask what the equilibrium response would be if shills were employed. For
instance, if shills always ensure that bidding on an item continues through at least 100 bids,
then real participants would (in equilibrium) have no reason to waste a bid in that initial
8range, since they will certainly be outbid. This is equivalent to starting the auction with an
initial price of 100s. This increases the expected nal price, but reduces the revenue from
bid fees by 100b. The net eect produces the same expected revenue of v   b.
More likely, a shill would operate by randomly bidding, allowing some auctions to close
with very few bids. If so, in equilibrium, the added probability of bidding by shills displaces
some of the probability of bidding by real participants | yet the aggregate probability of
a bid occuring, q, must maintain the indierence condition to keep the real participants
participating. For simplicity, suppose that a shill places the qth bid with probability 0 <
q < q. After a shill places a bid, she will win the auction with probability 1 q+1; if that
occurs, the auctioneer retains the item but receives no revenue from the nal price, though
he does collect the bid fees of all real participants.
This shill arrangement is reected in the following expression of expected prots (i.e.














The rst summation determines expected prot from the auction winner, who is a real bidder
with probability 1 q and pays sq in the nal price, but requires delivery of the item, causing
the auctioneer to incur cost v. Neither occurs if a shill bidder wins. The remaining terms
of the rst summation represent the aggregate probability of ending at q bids. The second
summation computes expected revenue from bid fees. The product indicates the aggregate
probability that qth bid occurs, which is multiplied by b(1 q), the expected bid fee revenue
from that bid since shill bidders do not actually pay.














To compare this to our previous expected revenue, note that without shill bidding, the
expected cost to the seller is v  1 = v   b, which also give an expected prot of 0. Shill
bidding of this form produces no additional prot.
3 Data
From the inception of their US website in September 2008 through January 2009, Swoopo.com
auctioned over 34 thousand items, all via pay-to-bid auctions. Most of these auctions are
9repetitions of identical objects, with only 623 unique items. Furthermore, a small handful
of items are auctioned much more frequently than the others; only 65 items were auctioned
more than 45 times, with the most popular (a Nintendo Wii system) being auctioned 2,728
times. In Table 2, we group these frequently-auctioned items into 6 categories (video games,
computer accessories, apparel, etc.) and report the number of unique items and total number
of auctions for each category.
Swoopo lists all of their ended auctions on their website. For each auction, the site
provides the suggested retail price, the nal auction price, the bid fees paid by the winner,
and the end time. Also listed is the bid fee and the price increment that occurs with each
new bid. Most auctions increase by $0.15, but penny auctions increase by $0.01. We divide
the nal price by the bid increment to get the total number of bids in each auction. We
multiply the number of bids by the bid fee and add this to the nal price to determine
Swoopo's total revenue for that auction.
While all Swoopo auctions involve the same bid fee, there is some variety in the rules
for nal prices. During this observation period, two-thirds of all Swoopo auctions followed a
standard pay-to-bid auction in which the winner pays the nal auction price. The others used
the xed price variation, where the winner pays a predetermined price. The most common
of these (12% of all auctions) was a 100% o auction, where the winner of the auction pays
nothing for the item except for the money already paid in bid fees.11
In many cases the suggested retail price is signicantly higher than what is readily avail-
able from other online retailers. To provide an alternative measure of retail price, we found
each item on Amazon.com. By this measure, Swoopo's suggested retail price is about 28%
higher than the price on Amazon.com (weighting items by the number of auctions for that
item).
Swoopo also provides the usernames of the winner and last 10 bidders of each auction.12
Across all of the auctions in our sample, there were 15,540,820 bids placed, of which 2%
occur as one of the last ten bids that we can observe. Among the last ten bidders across all
auctions, there are 69,519 unique usernames with 13,001 of these users winning at least one
item. Over 63% of the winners only win once and a very small number (less than 1%) have
won more than 25 auctions.
A common thought upon observing a pay-to-bid auction is why anyone would be the
rst bidder. While it is unlikely that the rst bidder will win the auction, we do have 134
auctions in which the rst bidder wins the auction, 299 where the 2nd bidder does, and 8,667
11Since January 10, 2009, Swoopo has stopped oering any xed price auctions. This may have been in
response to criticism that 100% o auctions bore too much resemblance to a lottery or rae.
12We cannot observe the full history of bids | that is, the identity of each bidder for each period. This
data would be needed to discern between the models of individual strategies developed in Section 2.1.
10that are won by one of the rst 9 bidders. In fact, two of the surprising predictions of the
model are that a large fraction of the auctions will end during the early bids and that the
(unconditional) probability of an auction ending at a given number of bids is decreasing in
the number of previous bids.
Swoopo provides bidders the option to use a bid butler which will place bids for them
based on preset parameters. To use the bid butler, the bidder decides at what price to start
bidding on an item, at what price to stop bidding on an item, and how many bids they are
willing to make. The bid butlers are designed to be as frugal as possible and will wait to bid
until there are fewer than 10 seconds left on the auction clock. We nd that 32% of the last
ten bids are made using a bid butler but 64% of auctions are won by someone using a bid
butler.
Swoopo is not the only website in the US to oer pay-to-bid auctions; ten others oered a
similar service during the time period of our analysis. However, using data from a web trac
monitoring company (Compete.com), summarized in Table 1, we found that Swoopo.com
accounted for almost half of the web trac going to this group of sites. One of the primary
advantages of studying Swoopo is that, unlike most competitors, it provides information on
all past auctions.
4 Evidence
Our empirical objective is to test whether our model of pay-to-bid auctions appropriately
describes observed bidding on Swoopo. We test this hypothesis by comparing the observed
distribution of the number of bids to the theoretical predictions produced by our model.
While our data oers a little variation in bid fees and price increments, the overwhelming
majority charged $0.75 and raised the price by $0.15; hence, no item was auctioned enough
times outside of this standard setup to provide useful statistical inference. Even so, v has a
much greater inuence on the theoretical distribution than b or s. Note that s has no impact
on expected revenue, v   b, and that b is typically two orders of magnitude smaller than v.
Where the same item has been auctioned many times, we assume that v is held constant
and that all variation in ending price is due to the equilibrium use of mixed strategies. We
repeat this analysis with 70 distinct items.
We start by providing some illustrative examples in Figure 1, showing the degree to which
the distribution of bidding behavior we observe in the Swoopo data matches the equilibrium
predictions of our model. In each example, the numbers along the x-axis are the number of
bids that occurred in an individual auction (which maps one-on-one with the revenue from
the auction). The y-axis is the probability (either theoretical or actual) that the auction
11ends at that number of bids.
The model predicts a distribution of ending bids based on the valuation of the item, the
bid fee, and the increment by which the nal price rises with each bid. The latter two are
clearly specied for each auction. For the valuation, we initially use the retail price reported
by Swoopo; however, it is quite possible that bidders may value an item more or less than
its retail price indicates. For instance, if the same item is available from internet retailers
at a discount, bidders would behave as if their true valuation is the discount price. One
would expect Swoopo bidders to be suciently internet-saavy to have checked Amazon.com
or similar sites for a price comparison. On the other hand, if the item were dicult to nd
through other outlets, such as the Wii video game console, the true valuation could be above
retail.
To account for this possibility, we compute a maximum likelihood estimate of the param-
eter v for each regularly auctioned item, chosen to maximize
P
i lnf(qi;v), where i represents
each observed auction of that item, qi is the ending number of bids in that auction, and f is
the theoretical distribution given in Equation 4. We then repeat our statistical tests using
this estimated valuation. Figure 2(b) compares the prices we obtain using our MLE method
with those found for the same item on Amazon.com. Our MLE method provides estimates
that are higher than the Amazon (the regression coecient on the tted line is 0.427) but
also a very close t along the regression line (the R2 of this regression is 0.818). In contrast,
a regression comparing Swoopo's reported retail prices with Amazon prices has a smaller
slope of 0.365 and an R2 of only 0.570 (shown in Figure 2(a)).
We should note that using the MLE estimates for v does not enable us to shape f(q) at
will. Increasing v will lengthen the support of f and decrease its curvature in a very particular
way; moreover, it will not change that f0(q) < 0 and f00(q) > 0. Also, in what follows, we
have set b and s to the objective values listed for each auction. When we simultaneously
estimated those parameters, for most auctions we recovered nearly the same objective values.
In those auctions where we did not, the t was equally bad whether selecting only v or also
selecting b and s.
The top row of Figure 1 displays the results from three of the most common non-video
game items; the bottom row has three of the most common video game items. The upper
gures provide visual evidence that the actual distribution of revenues matches very closely
with that predicted by the model; and the t is improved using the MLE valuations. A large
number of auctions end with few bids (and hence low revenue), and the probability of the
auction ending at q declines (at a decreasing rate) as q increases.
As a consequence, many of these auctions conclude in a net loss for Swoopo | for items
similar to those depicted in the top row, as many as 69% of the auctions of a given item will
12not generate enough revenue (in bid fees and nal price combined) to cover the retail price.
However, the long right tail generates enough compensating revenue so that, on average,
these auctions raise revenue equal to the valuation. These results also indicate that (for this
set of items) bidders may in fact be rational in participating in the pay-to-bid auction, even
early on in the auction, because of the relatively high probability of obtaining the item at a
price far below its retail price.
Items depicted in lower row of Figure 1 show that auctions for video game systems and
accessories do not match the predictions of our model very well. In particular, we nd there
is an initial range for which the probability is increasing in q, which cannot be generated by
this model under any parameter values. In addition, we nd that the density of ending bids
in the low end is much smaller than predicted, and the right tail of the distribution is much
thicker.
We next turn to some statistical tests comparing the match between the prediction of
our model and what we observe in the Swoopo data. We restrict our analysis to items that
are sold in 45 or more standard auctions. Out of 505 distinct items (sold in the standard
pay-to-bid auction), 65 meet this criterion. For each of these items, we perform a Pearson's
chi-square goodness of t test comparing the observed distribution of ending bids to the
theoretical distribution. We also perform a t-test comparing the theoretical and actual
mean revenue. In Table 2, we report the fraction of items for which the tests fail to reject
the null hypothesis that the observed data diers from the prediction of the model (based
on whether the test statistic corresponds to a p-value greater than .01, .05, and .10).
In Panel A of Table 2, we use the reported retail value of the item as our measure of
bidder's common valuation for the item. We group items into ve categories: computers,
computer accessories, home electronics, apparel, and video games. For instance, considering
computer-related items and using the .05 p-value as a threshold for our test, we nd that
when comparing the predicted and actual distribution, the majority of the time we fail to
reject that the two distribution are statistically dierent. The degree to which our model
matches the observed distribution of the data is much lower for video games and home
electronics, where we fail to reject that the two distributions are dierent only about 25% of
the time.
In the far right columns of Table 2 we look specically at mean revenue. Our model does
a worse job at predicting the mean revenue for an item, with us failing to reject that the
two means are dierent 42% of time for computers and even less often for the other items.
However, in this panel the valuation of the item is determined by the reported retail price,
which may be a poor proxy for the true valuation. Consider graph (c) of Figure 1, which
shows the ending bid distribution for an Invicta Diver Watch with a reported retail price of
13$370. Our MLE estimate suggests that the true valuation is actually more like $256, which
is also in line with other online retailers. When we use the MLE-based valuation, the plot
of our predicted distribution matches the data much more closely.
In Panel B of Table 2, we use our MLE-based valuations and report the fraction of the
items in each category for which we fail to reject at each of the three common statistical
cut-os. The goodness of t of our model goes up for all categories; for example, with all
apparel auctions, we fail to reject a dierence between the theory and data. On the other
hand, with video game items, we still only fail to reject that our predictions dier from the
data 46% of the time. In aggregate, auctions of 57 of the 72 items (or 79%) can be explained
by our theory (at the .05 p-value threshold).13
As a nal piece of evidence, in Figure 3 we compare the observed average revenue with
the theoretical expected revenue, reporting the dierence in standard deviation units. We
nd that most of the non-video game items clump very close to zero, with 90% of these items
having average revenue within one standard deviation of the prediction of our model. For
the video-game items, we also see the mode occurring near zero but there is a large right tail
to this distribution, with 40% of the items having average revenue greater than one standard
deviation above the model's prediction.
5 Risk preferences
To this point, we have assumed bidders to be risk neutral. We now make a minor adaptation
of our model by incorporating preferences towards risk. Since wealth is unobserved, we
sidestep this by assuming CARA utility: u(w) = 1 e w
 . From here, we follow the same
process as before, imposing indierence between placing a risky bid versus not participating,














eb   e(b+s(q 1) v): (6)
13We also used a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and found very similar results, with a slightly higher likelihood
of rejecting the null for some categories.
145.1 100% o auctions
As before we can construct a probability density function from these . In the special case















. Note that expected revenue is decreas-
ing in ; the auction generates more revenue as agents become less risk averse.
We can perform a maximum likelihood estimation on f(q) as before; however,  is not
separately identiable from v or b. This is because the distribution has the form f(q) =
(1   )q. Thus, the MLE procedure can only identify .
Fortunately, all of the items where Swoopo has routinely used 100% o auctions have an
obvious objective value for v. These items include cash ($1,000 or $80) and vouchers for free
Swoopo bids (either 300 or 50, worth $0.75 per bid). The bid fee b is also exogenously set,
so we can use the MLE procedure to identify .
For these items, we nd  to be slightly negative, between -0.001 and -0.01. This implies
that Swoopo participants are risk loving. The resulting theoretical distribution is depicted
in Figure 4; with the MLE risk preferences, the t is remarkable. Using risk neutral bidders
(and the objective value of v), the theoretical distribution would predict too few bids at
every point and hence too high a probability of ending early. With the addition of risk-
loving preferences, bidders become a bit more aggressive at every point of the auction.
5.2 Standard auctions
After incorporating risk preferences in a standard pay-to-bid auction, the resulting proba-
bility density is far less tractable:













Direct analytic solutions for expected revenue are no longer possible. Indeed, even the
indirect method used in the risk neutral case is no longer applicable, since the auction not
only creates value by transferring an item to someone who values it, but also creates risk,
whether for good ( < 0) or ill ( > 0). However, numerical computation is relatively
simple, revealing a few key features of f.
First, the support of f is the same as before, placing positive probability everywhere
15from 0  q  Q. Increases in v have essentially the same eect that they did in the risk-
neutral case: it will increase the support and atten the distribution. When  > 0 (i.e.
risk aversion), f has a similar convex shape to the risk neutral density function, only with
greater curvature as  rises.
The distribution behaves quite dierently for  < 0 (i.e. risk-loving). When  is very
close to zero, an inection point ^ q is introduced near zero such f00 < 0 below ^ q; thus f is
no longer strictly convex. As  decreases, this inection point takes on higher values, and
eventually, creates a hump-shaped distribution. As  becomes more negative, the q which
maximizes f increases.
To perform maximum likelihood estimation, we use numerical approximation of the den-
sity function. For each auctioned item, we estimate both the valuation and risk parameter,
which are identied by distinct rst-order conditions of this generalized pay-to-bid distribu-
tion. Note that even with these two degrees of freedom, we are not capable of replicating
every unimodal distribution, but are constrained to the particular shape described above.
After MLE, the resulting risk parameter  indicates that bidders on video game items
are mildly risk-loving, primarily in the range of -0.001 to -0.006, with a few as low as -0.025.
These values are signicantly lower than the estimated risk preferences of bettors at horse
race tracks: using the same functional form and assuming a bet (i.e. our bid fee) of $1,
Jullien and Salani e (2000) estimate  =  0:055.14 The resulting MLE valuations v are also
plausible for each item, generally below the retail price with the exception of items that were
in short supply during this data period. Figure 2(c) compares these to Amazon.com prices;
the associated regression has a steeper slope (0.571) than the risk-neutral MLE valuation in
Figure 2(b), and a slightly lower R2 of 0.756.
The improvement in t is again remarkable. Figure 5 illustrates the new theoretical
distribution, demonstrated on the same three items from the lower panel of Figure 1. The
risk neutral model was unable to match the hump shape of the distribution because for any
choice of the parameter v, f(q) was decreasing in q. In the altered model, f(q) will rst
rise then fall if  is suciently large; thus, early bidders are more likely to bid than risk
neutrality would imply.
Intuitively, this occurs because when q is low, there is greater variance in the outcome,
because the payo if no one else bids, v sq, is large. A risk-loving participant will be willing
to bid in spite of unfair odds as long as the gamble has a highly skewed payo. Thus q can
be larger than in the risk neutral model (more aggressive bidding) while still satisfying our
14Similar studies uses a functional form u(w) = awb, which has constant relative risk aversion. Ali (1977)
assumes an initial wealth w = 1 and estimates b = 1:178, or an absolute risk aversion (comparable to our )
of -0.178. Kanto, et al (1992) and Golec and Tamarkin (1998) arrive at similar estimates.
16indierence condition, and as a result, it is less likely that the auction ends with low q. As q
increases, though, the variance in outcome diminishes, and the same risk-loving participant
will require closer to fair odds in order to bid. Indeed, as the nal price sq approaches v, the
resulting q approaches the risk neutral result.
Panel C of Table 2 reports the degree of t for all auctions after MLE allowing for
risk-loving preferences. Note that nearly all of the auctions can be explained by the model
once risk preferences are included. In particular, nearly 50% more video game items t the
adapted model.15
5.3 Risk-loving preferences
It is not particularly surprising that Swoopo participants would have a preference for risk;
after all, this auction is essentially a form of gambling. Like a slot machine, the bidder
deposits a small fee to play, aspiring to a big payo (of obtaining the item well below its
value). The only dierence is that the probabilities of winning are endogenously determined.
The idea that a gambler would voluntarily take on risk, paying more than the expected
payout to play, is puzzling. Economists have tried to rationalize such behavior in one of
two routes: by assuming some intrinsic utility from placing the gamble or by assuming
convex preferences with respect to wealth.16 Regarding the former, it is noteworthy that
Swoopo prominently advertises itself as \entertainment shopping." While many economists
have referred to intrinsic utility as motivation for gambling, very few have provided formal
modeling of the concept. Diecidue, Schmidt, and Wakker (2004) provide a brief but useful
survey of these works and oer their own formal model. They conclude that utility from
gambling would necessarily contradict stochastic dominance.
We employ the alternative: assuming convex preferences (that is, increasing marginal
utility of wealth within some range). Friedman and Savage (1948) provided an early formal
model of this phenomenon. Their justication for increasing marginal utility was that major
increases in wealth would promote a person into a new social and economic status, while
minor increases in wealth would maintain a person within the same class and hence exhibit
diminishing marginal utility. This view was supported by Gregory (1980) and Brunk (1981).
More recent work by Golec and Tamarkin (1998) and Garrett and Sobel (1999) proposes
that what appears as risk-loving in the Friedman-Savage utility should be more aptly named
skewness-loving. In an empirical study of horse-track betting and US lottery games, respec-
15Again, Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests provided nearly identical results.
16In addition, much of behavioral economics is inspired by these and similar puzzles. These lines of work
oer alternatives to expected utility, such as prospect theory, ambiguity aversion, or bounded rationality, to
name a few. We omit discussion of these theories because their application in a game theoretic setting is not
a settled matter.
17tively, both papers conclude that gamblers experience disutility from variance in payos (i.e.
are still risk averse), but gain utility from skewness in payos. Golec and Tamarkin show
that this will appear as risk-loving preferences when estimating parameters for CRRA utility.
This view of risk-loving behavior seems appropriate for our model, particularly for items
such as video games. The bidders may not be able to justify (to their spouse, their parent,
or themselves) spending $300 on a Wii at a retail store; however, the potential to win the
Wii early in the auction for only a fraction of that makes it worth the $0.75 gamble, even
at unfair odds. As the number of bids (and hence the nal price) increase, the skewness in
outcome decreases and these gamblers are less tolerant of unfair odds. Indeed, as the nal
price approaches the retail price, q eventually adjusts so that bidding becomes a fair bet.
Figure 6 provides evidence of this behavior, plotting the expected payo for bidding on a
Wii game system conditional on the current number of bids. The conditional expected payo
is the probability that the auction will end before the next bid (conditional on the auction
reaching the current bid) times the net value derived by the winner (the valuation minus
the nal price). The theoretical plot derives conditional probabilities from the indierence
condition, while the observed plot extracts this information from the data.
The plot of the expected payo using the observed data is based on a two-step procedure.
First, we use a kernel regression to smooth the cumulative density function of the number
of bids at which the Wii auction ends, F(q). This is used to construct the expected payo,
(v   sq)
f(q)
1 F(q), where the latter term is the probability of the auction ending, conditional
on the auction reaching that number of bids. We then smooth this expected payo function
using a kernel regression and plot this function up to 1600 bids (the 95th percentile, or a
nal price that is 70% of the valuation).17 The expected payo from bidding is very low
at the start of the auction (around 22 cents) but rises because the probability of winning
increases faster than the net value of winning falls.
For more practical items such as computers or apparel, bidders behave as if they are risk
neutral.18 This probably reects that they intend to purchase the item from a traditional
retailer if unsuccessful at Swoopo.
17For both kernel regressions we use a Epanechnikov kernel and a bandwidth of 75. The pattern in gure
6 is the same when we use alternative bandwidths or use a local polynomial regression.
18The distinct behavior in video game auctions naturally raises the question of whether a dierent set of
bidders participate in video game versus other auctions, or if instead the same people participate in both
but behave more aggressively in video game auctions. We were not able to follow every bid on every auction,
but for a set of 1,084 auctions, we were able to record the usernames of most of the auction participants (as
opposed to only the last ten). Unfortunately, even for those auctions, we lack sucient observations for each
bidder to provide any meaningful insight on this question; only 2% of the bidders place more than 10 bids.
186 Conclusion
This paper presents a simple model of bidder choices in a pay-to-bid auction. In the symmet-
ric subgame perfect equilibrium, potential bidders are indierent about participating, and
the exact mixed strategy is determined by this indierence condition. Using these mixed
strategies we can establish that expected revenue will be near the bidders' valuation of the
auctioned item.
Even when restricted to risk neutral bidders, the model is able to explain a strong majority
of the observed data. However, items associated with video game systems routinely produce
more aggressive bidding and higher revenue than can be explained by this model. These
exceptions are the most protable of Swoopo's auctions, and are among the most frequently
run. Once we allow bidders to have preferences towards risk, the model can explain almost
all of the observed auctions. Buyers of video game systems have small preferences for risk
(which may be interpreted as a love of skewness), which makes them aggressive in the early
phase of the bidding.
On a broader level, the pay-to-bid auction describes an incremental king-of-the-hill con-
test. By incurring a sunk cost (e.g. bid fee), anyone can become the current king-of-the-hill;
yet that title only becomes permanent if all challengers give up. The contest is incremental
because each replacement of a king reduces the hill's value to the eventual winner.
For instance, this could describe a particular form of competition among rent seekers.
Suppose several rms were seeking the same exclusive license from a bribe-accepting reg-
ulator. The regulator could require an up-front bribe each time a rm wishes to make an
overture; moreover, to displace the previous overture, the current rm promises to return a
greater portion of the future rents to the regulator. The license is awarded once no additional
overtures are attempted, and is given to the rm with the last (and hence best) overture. A
similar story could be told for competition among suitors, showering gifts or attention on a
potential mate.
Applied to these situations, our risk-neutral model would predict that the regulator cap-
tures essentially the full value of the license (in expectation). The rms would be indierent
about participation ex-ante; yet ex-post, the winning rm will typically enjoy large rents,
with a nal price well below the full value. If the rms are risk loving, the regulator can
expect to extract even more than the full value, making this a far more protable means of
allocating the license than other auction formats. Indeed, risk-loving (or skewness-loving)
preferences might well be applicable if the residual rents would signicantly alter the winner's
social class or if, in the case of a suitor, the contest gives him a shot at a woman normally
far outside his league.
19Appendix
Mean and Variance of Revenue
To facilitate the analysis of the rst and second moments of the f distribution, we make use
of the ascending factorial or Pochhammer symbol: (a)k  a(a + 1)(a + k   1) =
 (a+k)
 (a) ,








































































can be rewritten as:


















An identity of ascending factorials provides that
(a)j















































Another transformation of ascending factorials establishes that (a)n+1   (x)n+1 = (a  
x)
Pn
k=0(a)k(x + k + 1)n k. Applying it here, let a = b v
s , x =  s+v








































































































Since (a)n+1 = (a + n)  (a)n and (a   1)n = a 1

























































+ (v   b)
But since b v
s + Q = 0, this yields ERev = v   b.




((b + s)q   v + b)
2 f(q)
= (v   b)
2   2(v   b)
Q X
q=1






=  (v   b)









With similar manipulation as above, this last sum is equal to
(b 2v)(b v)
(b+s)(b+2s). Hence, V ar =
b(v b)(s+v)
b+2s .
21Figure 1: Representative examples: comparison of the theoretical and actual distribution of
ending bids for each item.
Notes: The unit of observation is the individual auctions for each item. In each gure, the
x-axis denotes the nal number of bids placed for the item. The y-axis is the probability
that the auction concludes at that number of bids. Bars denote the observed frequencies;
the solid line gives the theoretical frequencies using the retail value and the dashed line does
the same using the MLE estimated value.
22Figure 2: Comparison of item valuations to Amazon.com prices
A. Retail value reported by Swoopo
B. MLE-estimated valuation
C. Risk MLE-estimated valuation
23Table 1: Monthly trac on pay-to-bid websites
Website # of unique visitors






All other sites 164,792 742,431
Total # of sites 11 35
All Pay-to-Bid Sites 1,223,842 3,015,352
Ebay.com 79,806,830 74,067,835
Pay-to-Bid Site Trac/Ebay Trac 1.5 % 4.1 %
Notes: Data from compete.com, a web trac monitoring company.
Figure 3: Deviation from Expected Revenue in risk neutral model (separately for video
games and other items)
Notes: The unit of observation is each unique item. The x-axis indicates by how many stan-
dard deviations the observed average revenue diers from the theoretical expected revenue.
The y-axis indicates the fraction of items auctioned with that observed outcome.
24Table 2: Statistical tests comparing theoretical distribution with observed data.
A. Using retail price as item valuation.
Pearsons 2 Test t-Test
(compares distributions) (compares means)
Item Type N obs p  .10 p  .05 p  .01 p  .10 p  .05 p  .01
Computers 7 521 0.571 0.571 0.714 0.286 0.429 0.429
Computer Accessories 24 3434 0.375 0.417 0.583 0.292 0.333 0.417
Home Electronics 7 1651 0.286 0.286 0.429 0.143 0.143 0.286
Apparel 14 1045 0.286 0.357 0.357 0.071 0.071 0.143
Movies 2 97 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Video Games 18 9831 0.111 0.111 0.222 0.000 0.056 0.167
B. Using MLE valuation of item
Pearsons 2 Test t-Test
Item Type N obs p  .10 p  .05 p  .01 p  .10 p  .05 p  .01
Computers 7 521 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Computer Accessories 24 3434 0.708 0.833 0.875 0.833 0.833 0.917
Home Electronics 7 1651 0.714 0.714 0.857 0.857 0.857 0.857
Apparel 14 1045 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.857 1.000 1.000
Movies 2 97 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Video Games 18 9831 0.500 0.500 0.611 0.500 0.611 0.667
C. Using MLE risk preferences and valuation of item
Pearsons 2 Test t-Test
Item Type N obs p  :10 p  :05 p  :01 p  .10 p  .05 p  .01
Computers 7 521 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Computer Accessories 24 3434 0.875 0.917 0.917 0.833 0.917 0.958
Home Electronics 7 1651 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Apparel 14 1045 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.769 0.769 0.923
Movies 2 97 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Video Games 18 9831 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
Notes: The number reported in each cell is the fraction of items for which the particular test
statistic has a p-value larger than the threshold indicated in each column. N refers to the
number of unique items in each category, while obs refers to the number of observed auctions
within that category.
25Figure 4: 100% O Auctions with risk-loving bidders: comparison of the theoretical and
actual distribution of ending bids for each item.
Notes: Risk MLE denotes the theoretical distribution of ending bids when MLE-estimated
bidder risk preferences is used; item value is assumed to be retail value.
Figure 5: Standard auctions with risk-loving bidders: comparison of the theoretical and
actual distribution of ending bids for each item.
Notes: Risk MLE denotes the theoretical distribution of ending bids when MLE-estimated
item value and bidder risk preferences are used.
26Figure 6: Expected payo at each point during the auction for a Wii video game unit.
Notes: The expected payo is the probability of the auction ending at each bid conditional
on the auction arriving at that point times the value of winning the item which is the
valuation minus the nal price. The expected payo must equal the bid fee of $0.75 to be
actuarially fair, which the theoretical curve reaches at 2260 bids (i.e. when the nal price
nearly equals the valuation). We smoothed the observed expected payo function using a
kernel regression. Bids above 1600 are excluded from the smoothing due to the sparseness
of data in that range (fewer than 5% of the observations).
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